India and the Nukes

Modi’s love affair with Japan seems to know no boundaries. In his second State visit to Japan in under two years, he has managed to ink a civilian nuclear power deal with his Japanese counterpart, Shinzo Abe. However, as expected, there were instances of domestic resistance in both the countries: a people’s movement against nuclear plant establishment in India, while a general sentiment that nuclear deals should not be made with non-NPT (Nuclear Proliferation Treaty) states prevailed in Japan.

Although the former is a concern that can be tackled with the count of years, the latter is something to contemplate upon. Would the public opinion in Japan be more disposed to India’s cause if India were a member of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group? Is it not valid to speculate that Japan would have unilaterally decided to permit such a deal had India been a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Bilateral Nuclear Deals

The nuclear deal with Japan has come at a cost that can have dynamic ramifications. In a first of its type, India has explicitly highlighted that it would not conduct nuclear tests in the future. As per media reports, American firms dealing in nuclear technology have significant relationships with Japanese establishments of the same nature.  Commentators have brought out the fact that this bilateral agreement bears many resemblances to the 2005 nuclear deal under the Bush administration. The Indo-US deal was hailed as a game changer in the diplomatic circles, whereby India was not only implicitly recognized as a responsible nuclear state, but also transformed India’s image in the international sphere from a nuclear pariah to a partner. The Bush administration, as per opinions, broke the ice by finding a modus vivendi with India. However, an exception cannot be made everywhere.

The Japanese, on the other hand, also have strategic interests in concluding the agreement. The Sino-Japanese rivalry has only heated up in the last few years, whose credit primarily goes to heightened tensions over the South China Sea dispute. Even if we are to move past the nuclear deal, there are a thousand other ventures where Tokyo would like to cooperate with New Delhi. Take for instance the bullet train, a field where Japan is keen and enthusiastic to invest. All of this essentially boils down to an advantage for India, as it can now effectively snub Chinese attempts of regional ascendancy.

India’s desire to get into the NSG

It must be noted that India has been desperately trying to get into the exclusive NSG club, wherein it would have untold benefits as far as nuclear commerce is concerned. As mentioned earlier, an important consideration of this consortium is that the members must be a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India has not signed the treaty for it considers it discriminatory, and rightly so. At this juncture, there is a vital consideration. Should India up the ante to get into the NSG despite opposition from global players? If the answer to that is affirmative, there are perils attached to it.

India’s entry into the NSG as an independent exception cannot bear expected results from the Indian point of view. This is mainly because Pakistan, too, seeks a place in the association: and an unbiased exception is incredibly difficult to justify. China would then pester and lobby for Pakistan’s admission: and thus India’s cardinal intent of joining the NSG would be nullified. Geopolitical tensions are always a top concern in South Asia. A recent development in the form of Parrikar’s personal musings about how India should abandon the “no first use” of nuclear weapons policy would only act as yet another deterrent.

The Last Say

As of now, it seems unlikely that India would get a stamp of approval to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Henceforth, it would be worthwhile to ensure that India lives up responsibly to its image of a peaceful nuclear country. It would be demoralizing on a diplomatic level to vigorously canvas for India’s entry into the exclusive club and then get an outright rejection. Moreover, regardless of any inherent lack of logic, China would always play the rhetoric of “no exceptions”: for India would not sign the NPT in the foreseeable future.  In my opinion, the world would definitely watch how India shapes its strategy as far as the India-Pakistan strains are concerned, as a litmus test for India’s commitment to international conventions.  Thus, the only feasible way to get out of this tangible mess of affairs is to exercise careful restraint in actions on an international level.