Delhi

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An Elusive Facade of Cooperative Federalism

Raj Bhavan, Kolkata. Photo for representational purposes.

Flashpoints in Centre-State relations have become increasingly common in India’s politico-administrative setup. While the Indian Constitution envisages a federal setup with a strong Centre, the provisions that inherently guarantee and thereby secure the onus of nurturing federal relations have also become dilatory over time. This has led to an unprecedented rise in vested political interests preceding the interests of national administration and has thus, often been at the expense of deteriorating relations with a select set of states. The recent confrontation between the Union Government and the state of West Bengal on the role of the Governor necessitates a close review of such an executive mechanism that has stood out as a prickly point on the fabric of cooperative federalism. In this essay, we shall cardinally look into the worrisome points between the Centre and States on this contentious issue, with an eye on the Sarkaria Commission recommendations.

In the context of India, a gubernatorial position is rather redundant. In fact, the Constituent Assembly had witnessed several debates about the utility of the position. While the President is the Head of State for the entire Indian Republic, the Governor is merely a vestige of the Centre who acts as the constitutional head of the state he is meant to serve. He has no real authority or power, and is in many cases, having lesser powers than the position of the President vis-a-vis his influence on the state. Biswanath Das, who was the Prime Minister of Odisha Province of British India and subsequently became Governor of Uttar Pradesh, prognosticated a situation wherein a Centrally-nominated Governor is not acceptable to a State government, especially if it is ruled by an opposition party having differences with the Centre. “In such circumstances, ‘rub’ can never be avoided if the power to give administrative pin-pricks is vested in the Governor,” he said. He further cautioned the Constituent Assembly that under the provisions of the British-enacted Government of India Act, 1935, there was no restraints on the Office of the Governor once appointed. He remarked that the Governor “had in his hands the nose-strings of the bull so to say. But there is nothing in this Constitution to control the Governor once he is appointed…”.

After a brief hiatus, the role of Governors in the Indian context has once again become a hotly contested issue. Most notably, almost all bitterness with the Raj Bhavans have arose in states ruled by opposition parties. This points to a rather devious undercurrent at play.  The image of Governors as being agents of the Centre has been rather difficult to erase, and has only been reinforced with time, opines Rakhahari Chatterji of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF). Apart from a lone judicial intervention that has now become a landmark judgement (SR Bommai v/s Union of India), there generally has not been any censure of the Centre for flagrant violations of its powers when it comes to appointment of Governors. Perhaps out of their contemporaries, Maharashtra’s Bhagat Singh Koshyari and West Bengal’s Jagdeep Dhankhar stand out as being politically-motivated persons holding a Constitutional post supposed to be neutral, independent and a guiding force for the states. Interestingly, both these occupants are former members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, and both have been constant in their criticism and tirades against the governments that they head in a titular manner. Constitutional propriety has been thrown to the wind and the long held tradition of Governors not airing their differences with the elected regime has been junked as well. This was observed very recently, when the West Bengal governor chose to visit Sitalkuchi and express his sympathies with those who had lost their lives in the violence, all the while defaming and lambasting the Trinamool Congress. More often than not, there has been an unfortunate congruency between his actions and the interests of the BJP, whose electoral juggernaut could not match the resistance offered by the Bengali ideology. Such malicious activities do not augur well for the esteem of the Office they hold and paints a blot on ensuing Centre-State relations.

Various well-intentioned attempts to study the role of the Governor in a democratic federal setup and offer suggestions to strengthen his position so as to enhance Centre-state relations were made. The Administrative Reforms Commission (1968), the Rajamannar Committee (1969), Committee of Governors of 1971, Bangalore Seminar of Experts in 1983 are amongst some of the most notable. The Sarkaria Commission, constituted in 1988 to suggest ways of solidying and promoting the spirit of cooperative federalism, also made key recommendations on the question of the Office of the Governor. It was categorical in suggesting that Governors should only be elected from a pool of eminent people who belong to a non-political background. Furthermore, an analysis of profiles of Governors who held office between 1950-2015 reveals that almost one in every two governors belonged to a political background. A quarter of the posts were held by retired Civil Servants, while the remaining pie was split between former judges, defence officers, academicians and others.

A disturbing trend has been picking up of Governors from incumbent Chief Ministers and Cabinet Ministers. This not only erodes trust of the state government in the Constitutional head but is also a major deterrent to the spirit of federalism. Perhaps the most glaring among them is the curious case of Sushil Kumar Shinde, who as the former Chief Minister of Maharashtra, was shunted out of the state as a Governor, and during his tenure as Governor he was again picked to the position of the Union Home Minister. Shivraj Patil, who served the UPA-I as the Union Home Minister, was also subsequently transferred to Raj Bhavan in Punjab. Sheila Dixit, the Congress stalwart who was a three-time Chief Minister of Delhi, lost to Arvind Kejriwal’s Aam Aadmi Party in the 2013 polls. Immediately after, she was positioned as the Governor of Kerala.

...such a Governor will have no independence and my point is that the Centre might try to do some mischief through that man

- Prof. Shibban Lal Saxena, Member of Constituent Assembly

While the issue of political loyalties conflict regularly with the ideals of the position, yet another pertinent concern often goes unnoticed in the debate. The Governor of a State has no constitutional remedy against his removal. There is no fixed tenure of the Governor, and he is to ideally hold office for a period of five years in consonance with the “pleasure of the president”. A legal reading of the same would imply that a change in Central Government may imply a natural replacement of existing Governors of states with ones cherry-picked by the Central Government. The Union Government may also call for an immediate shunting out of a Governor, if it feels the institution does not serve its own agenda. The matter was up for an extensive debate in the Constituent Assembly as well. K.T Shah, a member of the Assembly, argued that “so long as a Governor acts in accordance with the advice of the Constitutional advisers of the province (Council of Ministers), he should. . . be irremovable during his term of office, that is, five years”. Professor Shibban Lal Saxena, another member of the CA, was apprehensive that the Central Government may deliberately try and influence the activities, wisdom and discretion of an appointed Governor harnessing the backdrop of an uncertainty in term. He said, “when once a Governor has been appointed, I do not see why he should not continue in office for his full five years and why you should make him removable by the President at his whims. . . Such a Governor will have no independence and my point is that the Centre might try to do some mischief through that man.”

Prof. Saxena’s anatomy and prognosis of the grave faultline has been proven many a times in the workings of the polity. Time and again, the government at the helm of the Centre has blatantly used this very uncertainty of tenure to their advantage, by morally compelling the Governors to go against the ground rules of ethics and constitutional propriety. Statistically, only about 20% of Governors have been able to complete their complete, ideal term of office of five years. Those who have displayed some spine or resistance to intimidatory tactics from the Centre have often been transferred to states considered mostly insignificant, often acting as a demoralising force so much so that many of them would have considered resignation as a viable choice. Post 1967, the average tenure of a Governor has drastically decreased, as analysed by the Sarkaria Commission. It finds that between 1947 and 31 March 1967, out of sixty-six gubernatorial tenures, only thirty-two, that is, about 50 per cent, lasted a full 5-year term. In between 1 April 1967 and 31 October 1986, only 18 out of 88 tenures lasted full 5 years- down to a miserable 20 percent.

The final straw in the tug of war between the Centre and the States has been the imposition of President’s Rule (Article 356). An imposition of President’s Rule means the overthrow of an elected state regime. Imposition of President’s Rule by the Central Government has belied the expectations of the Constituent Assembly, who had hoped that the use of the measure would be highly restrictive, prudent and only in cases of emergent and compelling compulsions for the Centre to take the reigns of states in the spotlight. Except IK Gujral, almost all other Prime Ministers have resorted to the use of this tool at least once in their tenures. Indira Gandhi, who had an infamous track record of sidelining democracy and having a preference for an authoritarian style of governance, used it at wanton will and without sparing a second thought about the ramifications of her actions. The Sarkaria Commission has examined the merits of the imposition of President’s rule in states between 1950 and 1987 and found that only 23 out of 75 instances of its use during the period were inevitable. However, it was during her son Rajiv Gandhi’s term as the Prime Minister that the dissolution of SR Bommai-led government of Karnataka created a massive stir in Indian politics.

Governor P. Venkatsubbiah’s report claiming the breakdown of Constitutional apparatus of the state was contested in the Supreme Court by SR Bommai. In 1994, the Supreme Court laid down strict conditions with regards to the exercise of the Governor’s discretionary power to frame a report against the State government calling for dissolution of the legislature. ‘Floor tests’ became a mandatory requirement post the judgement and the President’s final decision on the report by the Governor became subject to judicial review, which was earlier provided blanket immunity from judicial scrutiny.

A Way Forward

The implications of a biased Governor as the Constitutional head of the basic building block of any federation- a state- amounts to gross violation of the sanctity of his post and only provides impetus to unwarranted impediment of the normal functioning of a democratically-elected popular state legislature. In this regard, advisory committees set up in good faith by past governments have not cut much ice. In fact, the only check against such flagrant violations came in the form of judicial interventions from time to time. One of the more remarkable judgements which created a history was the reversal of the President’s Rule in Arunachal Pradesh in 2016. A group of rebel Congressmen and BJP leaders colluded together to overthrow the-then government. The Supreme Court swiftly took notice of the incident and after a thorough review of the means and backdrop concerning such an imposition, found the decision by the President as unmaintainable. For the first time, a newly formed government was dislodged only to restore the legitimate previous government that had been a victim of malicious intent of the Centre.

One of the foremost reforms required at this hour is an overhaul to the present system of pick-and-choose by the Central Government when it comes to the appointment of Governors. If Governors are supposed to be an independent Constitutional post, then there is absolutely no necessity for the Centre to have a final say in terms of such appointments. Rather, it should be the prerogative of the Inter-State councils to recommend the names of eminent people who have demonstrated their capability of administration or responsibility to take up such positions. Such a decision tendered by the Inter-State councils should be binding on the President, much like the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers is. This would eliminate clear-cut cases of partisanship during the period of appointment and thus may soothe relations between the Constitutional Head of the state and the presiding executive, i.e, the Chief Minister.

Secondly, it should be mandated by law that Governors are not to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the working of the State Legislature in public. Perhaps, the institution can take a lesson or two from that of the British Monarch, among whose duties come a non-display of any emotion on any matter of governance or administration or event, which either directly or indirectly concerns the State government. Of course, he can put forward his views and recommendations in private to the Chief Minister, or can lend an ear to the Opposition parties and take note of their grievances. By banning any such form of public display of sympathy or emotion, the Office of the Governor would be strengthened because in such a scenario, holders of such a post would not be preoccupied hunting for opportunities to score political brownie points. Thirdly, additional forums for speedy redressal of grievances by State governments against Governors need to be created to ensure harmonious performance of duties as enshrined in the Constitution. At present, the absence of any such dedicated channel compel states to resort to judicial interventions, which are often time consuming and complex. However, allowing for alternative modes of engagement, wherein any pain point highlighted by the State can be considered on its merit and subsequent actions taken, can help reduce a lot of extant friction.

Lastly, Governors need to be given a security of tenure. Even Civil Servants who have been selected into State cadres through the Union Public Service Commission enjoy some security with respect to their posting. However, the variable nature of a Governor’s position allows for greed and political biases to creep into the mind of an incumbent, which is dangerous and contrary to the spirit of federalism. Ensuring a fixed tenure, of course with provisions of dismissal in case of absolute incompetence, would help eliminate such insecurities and rather direct the work of the Governor towards constructive addition to that of the State government’s initiatives.

The Office of the Governor is that of high esteem and is designed to be a guiding force for the State government to take advice from and learn from the experience of the administrator. Instead, the position has been thrown open to slandering and diatribes, in part because of the lackadaisical attitude of those who have held the seat themselves, and the rest because of the misuse of the powers vested in the Governor. Cooperative federalism is a notion that does not come to existence overnight. The Governor’s position and sanctity, as originally envisioned by members of the Constituent Assembly under the leadership of Babasaheb Ambedkar, needs to be restored at the earliest to avoid further corrosion of credibility to the institution, which has already taken a major hit today.

Populism over Prudence

The Interim Budget prima facie looks like a blunt attempt to appease important sections and classes in India that could reap rich electoral dividends: with the limelight on the farmer, the salaried taxpayers, and the demographically strong unorganised sector. Departing from the convention that interim budgets must do no macroeconomic harm, it was an instrument to drive votes for the meeting of narrow political ends. This is thus, a textbook case of populism over prudence.

The Union Budget allocation for 2019-20 is about 10% higher than that of its predecessor, with an outlay of ₹27.8 lakh crores. While most sectors witnessed a rise in allocation of funds in absolute terms, their share as a percentage of the total funds demarcated has fallen. Interest payments on debt accounted for the lion’s share in the 2020 budget: 24% (₹575,795 crores). Defence sector spending came a close second (₹284,733 cr), and was followed by subsidies (food, fuel and fertiliser subsidies), which totalled an expenditure of ₹264,336 crores (10-11% each).

Above: Comparison of Funds Alloted to Different Ministries

The budget was expected to primarily focus on a resolution to the agrarian distress, but the government went out of its way to ensure that the middle class and the informal sector workers did not harbour any feeling of being left out. Hence, the budget was mostly an appeasement budget; one laced with doles and sops- and hardly any revenue-generating schemes. Under the Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi (PM-KISAN) scheme, farmers who have holdings less than 2 acres will be entitled to an annual sum of ₹6,000 per family. The agricultural distress is a resultant of traditionally low rates of productivity, coupled with drastic price falls and low size of farm holdings. In an op-ed, C. Rangarajan writes how the average farm size declined from 2.3 hectares in 1970-71 to 1.08 hectares in 2015-16. This is a barrier to efficient use of modern agricultural methods, including mechanisation and other novel technologies like precision farming, which can push current production capacities to a new horizon. Thus, a price support mechanism must be put in place urgently. The government’s hastily announced PM-KISAN, while harbouring good intent, has several fault lines. A permanent solution can only be implemented once long-run considerations are taken into account. Telangana’s Rythu Bandhu scheme which offers ₹10,000 per acre, per year, is more inclusive and is a better choice overall. Odisha’s newly introduced KALIA scheme is also a step in the positive direction.

The Modi government has come up with sufficient relief for the middle class, targeting especially the salaried group, and workers lodged in the informal sector. The Income Tax exemption limit has been raised to ₹500,000 from ₹250,000. This is a direct blow to the already frailty tax collections in India. Income Tax departmental data for the year 2017-18 showed that 66% of the return filers fell under the ₹5-lakh bracket. Hence, the move will wipe out almost 66% of all previously eligible taxpayers from the tax net, and is sure to dent any immediate prospects of tax-fuelled growth. The standard deduction limit has been raised from ₹40,000 to ₹50,000. The Pradhan Mantri Sharam Yogi Maandhan Scheme has been developed as a mega-pension scheme for the unorganised sector, which will pay ₹3,000/- a month to registered beneficiaries. The recent CMIE Report has highlighted how 11 million jobs were lost in 2017-2018 alone, out of which 8.8 million were women.

Union Finance Minister Piyush Goyal announced that in a bid to fund the newly introduced schemes, the government would miss its fiscal deficit target not only for the upcoming year, but also for 2020. Governmental fiscal deficit for 2018-19 and 2019-20 would be 3.4%. In fact, funding the PM-KISAN scheme alone would entail a DBT burden of ₹75,000 crore to the exchequer. The NK Singh Committee on the FRBM Act, had proposed that the fiscal deficit was to be contained within 3.0% of GDP in FY18-20, 2.8% in FY21, 2.6% in FY22, and finally 2.5% in FY23. The government has thus, in the act of fiscal profligacy, sent fiscal prudence for a toss. Furthermore, while the government is overly enthusiastic about a sharp spike in GST collections, the fact remains that receipts from the GST is ₹1 trillion less than the budgetary estimates. Fiscal marksmanship analysis must be implemented rigorously and should try to close the gap between actual and predicted values.Arvind Subramanian mentions that while new schemes are constantly introduced, old schemes that are no longer relevant are hardly taken off the funding radars. This glaring error costs the government by causing fiscal leakage. For example, there is a ninety-six year old scheme, called the ‘Livestock Health and Disease Control’ (under the Department of Animal Husbandry), and it was alloted ₹251 crores in the Union Budget 2015-16. Moreover, pile up of new, expansive schemes pushes the government into higher debt levels. Celebrated Harvard economist Kenneth Rogeff, had predicted that countries with a debt/GDP ratio greater than 90% experience negative growth rates. This was evident through breakdown of Greece’s financial environment. Greece had a staggering debt/GDP ratio of 188% when the economy collapsed. India’s debt/GDP in 2017 touched 71.18% in 2017, and came marginally down to 69.55% in 2018. Thus, consistent and serious efforts must be made to bring down the debt levels.

Global rating agency Moody’s has marked India’s interim budget as “credit-negative”, underscoring the fact that it has only give-aways and little to recover from. Business tycoon Anand Mahindra remarked that the budget was a “pump-priming” exercise for the government, as higher incomes would lead to greater consumption and drive growth. In my opinion, several schemes that have little rational base can be wiped off and their funds can be relocated to more efficient schemes. For example, farmer support which has been pegged at ₹6,000 can be increased if fertiliser subsidies are decreased, as excessive use of fertilisers and soil enhancers takes a toll on the long term farm productivity (we are over-discounting fertilisers in any case). Disregard for fiscal discipline, especially in times when the chilly winds of protectionism are blowing all over the global economy, is a dangerous trend. As Paul Krugman puts it aptly, it is prudent to maintain “profligacy in depression, and austerity in good times”. Well said!

The Deadlock of the Debating Platform

My health is fine but the health of Parliament is not. I feel like resigning.
– LK Advani, 15 December 2016

The Indian Parliament, the Sansad, is the executive abode of the highest tier of legislative officials. This holy sanctuary of debating has been subject to ruthless, deliberate disruption of proceedings. From immature attempts to gain publicity, to mud-slinging and on-the-face slandering, the Parliament has witnessed it all.  The present-day situation does not look exceptionally bright; for it wears the same dull grey of reminiscence of the yesteryears of parliamentary disruption. This phenomenon of stalling the Parliament to push forward demands is downright wrong and immoral: a manner of lackadaisical etiquette by elected representatives of the people should be tantamount to a criminal offence.

 

Making an approximate estimate, if all the three sessions of the Houses of Parliament are put in order, then it effectively functions for one hundred days a year. According to data put out by the Lok Sabha secretariat, the seventh session of the Lok Sabha under the iron lady, Smt. Indira Gandhi was the most productive, accounting for 120% of the assigned Lok Sabha time worth of constructive debating. What is disheartening, however, is the fact that this consistent record of constructive debating time has now degenerated into a slump that only sees a steep downfall. As per the following graph compiled from official data, it is evident that the last session of the Lok Sabha was the worst of the lot, accounting for only 62% of the time being used for work. The Lower House could not function for the rest of the allotted time due to disruptions and repeated adjournments.

 

Even on discounting items that are difficult to impute costs to (free petrol, subsidies, telephone calls, and much more), the daily expenditure of Parliament sits at a whopping cost of Rs. 2 crores. Hence, each Parliamentary minute is worth Rs. 2.5 lakhs. The exchequer bears this burden to facilitate smooth conduct of legislative business for the betterment and welfare of the nation. These costs are indirectly paid for by the common man on an individual level in the form of taxes levied at different junctures.  Hence, if the stakes are so high, should the Members of Parliament not be accountable to the public for the work they do in the Houses of Legislature? Should the members who serve as repetitive impediments to the functioning of the Lok Sabha not be subject to automatic disqualification? Is it not economically unsustainable to harbour such disinterested people who find pleasure only in deterring the chamber of Indian legislature?

It is important to remember that while the Parliament does lose out on a considerable amount of moolah that could have been preserved, a stalemate condition also hampers the probability of taking the country forward, one step at a time. The Modi government, ever since its inception, has pointed to the need to improve the work culture and an emphasis on indigenous industries. Under the tagline Make in India, he has been successful in attracting investments. This dynamic influx of new investments and the ever-changing economic terrains require vigilant watch and effective laws that are devoid of fatal loopholes. Such laws that need to be put into effect pan-India can only be deliberated upon by the Union Parliament.

Disruptions in Parliament are now a result of cheap vendetta politics. Both the major players, the BJP and the Indian National Congress, are equally guilty of having resorted to such form of unwanted interference. During earlier years of the UPA regime, it was the BJP that had sought refuge in such unorthodox methods to derail the proceedings. Now, as fate would have it, the Congress is paying back the government in its own coin. Back in 2006, the veteran journalist and author Khuswant Singh lamented that the more he saw the Parliament conducting its ‘business’, the more he felt it was on the verge of collapsing. The authenticity of the statement would be applicable for years to come, given the trend of functioning.

This marked change in attitude to parliamentary proceedings must be analysed through pen and paper. It is definitely not easy to be in the boots of a Parliamentarian, and being cynical of such people is a very easy task to do. As is justified by general wit, the first few sessions of the Lok Sabha (1950-early sixties) observed heavy activity in legislative transactions. The time spent by successive sessions of the Lok Sabha has since mellowed down. The First Lok Sabha session devoted forty-nine percent of its time to the legislative business. Successive sessions till the eighth Lok Sabha ranged from twenty-two to twenty-eight percent (22%-28%) for the time dedicated to legislative work, with the Ninth Lok Sabha plunging to an all-time low of 16%. This reduction in legislative work can also be attributed to the emergence of the Cabinet form of government. The Cabinet, which essentially mirrors the Government elected, takes all of the decisions on the guidance of the Prime Minister. The Cabinet is in turn responsible to the Lok Sabha. This system was devised to render a smooth edge to the working of the Lower House.

Despite all the advantages that the Cabinet system may possess, it is rendered ineffective and useless if the Parliament itself does not function the way it is meant to be. This sanctum sanctorum of policy debating has been prone to attacks on its system of operation. Of what good is the Cabinet if there are no questions raised on the viability or need of a proposal? Questioning and defending bills are one of the most important tasks assigned to parliamentarians, and it should be their sacred duty to ensure that the sanctity of such a process is accorded its due respect. This provides the essence of democracy, a fundamental right of every Indian citizen.

As responsible citizens, it is definitely heart-wrenching to see the Parliament degrade into such low standards of operation unseen in previous years. It is my earnest hope that things take a turn for the good in days to come, as yet another session of the Parliament draws to a close. Twenty Sixteen has neared its death, and now it is time for Twenty Seventeen to bring in fresh hopes. The reprehensible divisiveness of party politics should not override the devotion of serving in the best interests of the country. It is our India, and only when we become mature enough to take the decisions for ourselves, dumping behind frail temporal loyalties, can we progress.

The Kejriwal Kaleidoscope

There is a fine line between a government that is deemed successful and a government incapable of tending to even the most basic needs of its own citizens. Is Kejriwal a success, or has he proved to be a total failure? Has Kejriwal remained loyal to his pre-election manifesto, or does he still loom among the corridors of uncertainty? Ask any aam aadmi and it does not require much of wit to come up with an answer that bears strict resemblances to the latter proposition of failure.

It would be worthwhile to disclose that I had, on a personal level, supported Kejriwal in his second run for Chief Ministership. Although his previous government had a tenure of a mere count of forty-nine days, that tenure had some glimpses of positive reform in it. President’s Rule followed, and then came the big State elections. People felt that the Aam Aadmi Party deserved a second chance; a chance that pardoned any blunder that the government might have made earlier, and a chance that promised a fresh start to the party. There was an ambient sensation that there was, finally, a political startup that had all the right ingredients: a reputation unblotted by the taint of any unethical offences, and a promise to bring in populist reforms by cutting down on corruption. As history has it, Kejriwal took the vow of office on the fourteenth of February, 2015, pledging to remove all traces of corruption and misgovernance. That pledge now looks no more than a cruel irony to me.

At the end of this period, the only thing that has kept Kejriwal’s party alive is the rhetoric of blame-game politics. From verbal wars with the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi to branding the Prime Minister a ‘psychopath’, he has left no stone unturned in this dirty game of his. It is possible that Kejriwal might have had no practical experience of running a government before. It is acceptable that the claims inscribed in his pre-poll manifesto may have been, after all, hollow and rather tall. However, that is no excuse to run away from the responsibilities. Over the present incumbency, instead of trying to rectify the domains of concern and areas that required a vigilant eye, he has played with the victim card. As a Chief Minister, that is an indefensible and lame rationale to justify his position. If you start something, you have to be the person to take the initiative to make it a success, and you have the sole responsibility to bring it to a terminating point. That essentially means to discharge one’s responsibilities in the most efficient way possible. Despite several litigation cases and his personal attacks on State dignitaries, Kejriwal has had no time to rest. Mud-slinging has become his day job, and the common man in Delhi has to bear the brunt of the Centre-State friction. In politics, it is expected that there would be tensions. Although unhealthy, the State administration has no right to put the populace in trouble by trying to point fingers at others. That is not good management, that is poor administration at its height. Going by the rigorous standards, Mr CM has scored a big zero. Perhaps, a negative mark.

The second of the unpardonable mistakes that Kejriwal has committed in his second stint is the failure to realise and implement his manifesto highlights. Plans of installing a million security cameras, making free Wi-Fi a reality in Delhi, establishing nine hundred public health centres, halving electricity bills and a promise to make potable water available free of charge have all gone haywire. The Public Works Department under State control could not carry out repair works pegged at less than two crore rupees, due to an acute lack of funds as per government sources. Is it not ironical that the party had sanctioned 526 crores in its advertisement and media campaigns, from the public exchequer, and then shamelessly professed the cause of severe deficiency of funds? This is a clear case of illicit duplicity and two-facedness. It has also failed on its pillar point in the manifesto: to get rid of the VIP Culture. If a four-hundred percent increase in salary is not a mirror of the VIP culture, I do not know what that means.

Kejriwal has not only politicised the issue of rapes and safety of women in the NCR region but also made a fool of himself in the domestic sphere due to the state of affairs that clearly show the tables have turned. For example, the Muffler Man used to launch diatribes against Sheila Dikshit, the former CM:

More often than not, we find Kejriwal the helpless person. In fact, when questioned about rising deflowering statistics, he has replied with the same rationale of the Delhi police being under the Central government and not directly reporting to the State administration. Under his administration, rapes have gone up by 27% from 6488 in 2014 to 7566 in 2015. Despite assurances of explicit arrangements being made to avoid any excuse or slip-up, only nine fast track courts have been established. What is worrying is that the trial for ninety-three (93%) percent of the accused are pending for the last three years. How perfect an example of hypocrisy is that?

There are a thousand other realms where he has equivalently failed. He has metamorphosed from an idol of reverence to just another uncontended politician looking to serve his own interests. He has transfigured from the ideal democratic figure to the unwanted dictator in the group. The expulsion of senior henchmen like Yogendra Yadav and Prashant Bhushan only offered a peek into the divisiveness and factionalism that pervades the group. Their expulsion sent a clear message that Arvind has sought to be the chieftain for his own political mileage; and that he is not ready to sacrifice it for anything else. While going through the news today, I found that Kejriwal has again resorted to hasty decision making, his supreme nemesis and his bete noire, by asking for the rollback of the demonetization move. Is he unaware that a rollback of the demonetization at this point of time is just a silly proposition, and that it has no pragmatic value attached to it? As a responsible politician who uses his office of legislature well, it would be his duty to suggest changes and amendments. Kejriwal, who seeks exclusivity from the rest (but yet finds solace confiding in Mamata and the Thackerays) has made it his signature move now to make such abrupt demands that are difficult to comprehend in any possible interpretation.

As a previous supporter, I feel betrayed, and this is perhaps the case with the vast majority of Delhiites who trusted Kejriwal with sixty-seven out of the seventy seats in the Delhi Legislative Assembly. Every Delhiite feels robbed of his voice and feels crushed under the onus of misgovernance. Running a State Government is not a child’s play, and hence Kejriwal should realise immediately that no amount of excuses can render him free from all allegations of poor governance. No one would listen to how the Centre did not cooperate. After all, when life gives you lemons, you ought to make a lemonade. His childish moves and comments have irritated all sane-thinking people (including me), and I would be eagerly awaiting the next State elections. There is no point warring with the Lieutenant Governor when you cannot resolve your internal disputes and cracks. Arvind Kejriwal has mutated into a dictatorial figure with no clear aims, a rudderless tug-boat venturing in the stormy seas of national politics.

If people say he is an anarchist, I would heartily agree with it.